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Abstract
Background: The increasing debate on financial incentives for organ donation raises concerns
about a "commodification of the human body". Philosophical-ethical stances on this development
depend on assumptions concerning the body and how people think about it. In our qualitative
empirical study we analyze public attitudes towards organ donation in their specific relation to
conceptions of the human body in four European countries (Cyprus, Germany, the Netherlands
and Sweden). This approach aims at a more context-sensitive picture of what "commodification of
the body" can mean in concrete clinical decisions concerning organ donation.
Results:  We find that moral intuitions concerning organ donation are rooted in various
conceptions of the human body and its relation to the self: a) the body as a mechanical object
owned by the self, b) the body as a part of a higher order embodying the self, and c) the body as a
hierarchy of organs constitutive of the self.
Conclusion: The language of commodification is much too simple to capture what is at stake in
everyday life intuitions about organ donation and organ sale. We discuss how the plurality of
underlying body-self conceptions can be taken into account in the ethical debate, pointing out
consequences for an anthropologically informed approach and for a liberal perspective.
Introduction
In September 1999, visitors to the internet auction web-
site eBay were presented with an unconventional offer: A
human kidney, praised as "fully functional" in the accom-
panying advertisement text. Bidding for the organ began
at $25,000 and soon reached $5,750,100, but since organ
trafficking constitutes a criminal offence under the US-
National Organ Transplants Act, eBay stopped the auction
as soon as it was informed. Nevertheless, the case attracted
broad media attention and aroused considerable public
debate [1-3].
The incident could easily be dismissed as just another
bizarre internet episode, and was in any case probably a
hoax [4]. In two respects, however, it appears to be quite
characteristic of certain tendencies in contemporary soci-
ety [5]: First, it seems to represent a general trend of com-
mercialization affecting more and more areas of personal
life and social relationships, now even encroaching upon
the human body and turning it into a commodity
(indeed, real offers of human kidneys are still easy to find
on the internet) [6]. And secondly, the crossing of this last,
"physical" border obviously provokes a culturally deeply-
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rooted unease among the general public in most western
countries.
Subsumed under the catchphrase "commodification of
the human body", the critical reflection of this develop-
ment constitutes an important issue in current bioethics,
most prominently in the debates about market models for
blood, tissue and organ procurement [7,8]. However,
while the commodification debate seems to touch upon
very strong intuitions about the nature of the body and its
moral implications, these intuitions are often not easy to
explain and to translate into rational, intersubjectively
convincing bioethical arguments [9]. In the spirit of
empirically-informed ethics [10], one step in this direc-
tion could be to take into account the general public and
explore their views and attitudes in order to achieve a
more context-sensitive picture of the positions and argu-
ments occurring.
Against this background, we want to empirically investi-
gate the conceptions of the human body involved in the
public debate and their role in public attitudes towards
organ transplantation: How are the body and its parts per-
ceived and conceptualized and what are the implications
for the evaluation of different modes of organ procure-
ment from altruistic donation to profit-oriented sale? We
start with a theoretical overview of body conceptions in
recent ethical and political discussions about the commer-
cialization of organ donation. In the methodological sec-
tion, we give a short description of our own research
methods. Our analysis is based on socio-empirical mate-
rial from focus group discussions on transplantation med-
icine made up of lay people and patients in four European
countries (Cyprus, Germany, the Netherlands, and Swe-
den) [11]. We examine three different body conceptions
brought forward by the participants and their argumenta-
tive use, showing that the language of commodification is
much too simple to capture what is at stake in everyday
life intuitions about organ sale. In the discussion, we
revisit the theoretical level in the light of our empirical
findings and draw conclusions for the ethical and political
debate on organ donation and its commercialization.
Background: The human body in the debate of 
organ donation and its commercialization
The commodification debate shows paradigmatically that
an issue like organ donation and especially organ trade
[12] not only concerns our explicit evaluative and norma-
tive standards, but also culturally deeply-rooted ideas con-
cerning human nature and existence, personhood,
personal identity and the body [13,14]. The concept of
commodification [15] entails that an entity is viewed and
treated as a commodity, that is, an instrumental object
without subjectivity and intrinsic value which can be
replaced by similar objects or money [16]. Therefore,
commodification arguments for (or against) the commer-
cialization of organ procurement obviously draw on some
conception of the human body which specifies why it is
(or is not) adequate to view and treat it this way.
In the Kantian tradition, for example, scholars usually
assume that the body is an essential part of the person as
such and that persons generally have dignity, that is,
incomparable value, and represent an end in themselves.
Kantian philosophers therefore conclude that it would be
wrong to use parts of our bodies „as a means only” [17] or
even sell them because this would infringe upon our
moral status as persons [18]. And especially in Marxist
social philosophy, criticizing the adverse impacts of uni-
versal commodification in modern capitalistic society in
terms of "commodity fetishism" and "alienation" has a
long tradition. In analogy to Marx's considerations about
the commodification of labor power, markets for body
parts are deemed problematic because of their exploitative
nature and dehumanizing effects on individuals and soci-
eties ([19], p. 3f.). On the other hand, many proponents
of a commercialization of organ procurement [20] state
that there is nothing wrong with commodification. Prem-
ising Locke's idea that everyone is the rightful owner of his
person and faculties, especially some liberals derive a spe-
cific conception of "self-ownership" which entails that
"each person is free to do with his body whatever he
chooses so long as he does not cause or threaten any harm
to non-consenting others" ([21], p. 40). Since most peo-
ple tend to associate ownership with the right to aliena-
tion, this conception also encompasses the freedom to sell
parts of one's body [22]. This line of thought seems to pre-
suppose that the self can act as an autonomous authority
disposing over its body like over some kind of property
[23].
Thus, on both sides of the debate, addressing the question
as to whether commodification of the body and its parts
is justifiable apparently entails certain basic assumptions
regarding what the body means for the self and the person
as such [24]. In order to give an overview of these assump-
tions and systematize their role in the debate, Joralemon
and Cox ([25], p. 28) have introduced a conceptual
matrix. According to them, the spectrum of possible
standpoints can be roughly structured along two axes: (a)
a variety of approaches to organ acquisition resting on differ-
ent degrees of voluntariness which range from altruistic
donation with prior consent on the one end of the scale
over several stages of external motivation by financial
incentives to coercion via conscription on the other; and
(b) a scale of conceptions of the self and its relation to the body
which range from the monistic idea of the body as identi-
cal with the self on the one hand to a dualistic notion of
the body as a piece of property of the detached self on the
other. According to this scheme, for example, donation onPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:4 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/4
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the basis of a narrow consent solution is the result of a vol-
untary and purely altruistic (that is: supererogatory)
choice and presupposes a monistic idea of the body as
equatable with the self. On the other side of the spectrum
are inter-vivos sale of organs. They are located in the less
voluntary/more dualistic quadrant because potential
donors are supposed to be coerced to do something they
would not otherwise do on the basis of a body-as-property
paradigm.
Clearly, these interrelations between body conceptions,
conceptions of commodity and the human being are in
need of further investigation – not only from a philosoph-
ical point of view, but also on the level of empirically
informed ethics. Otherwise, the dynamics of individual
and social decisions taking place in concrete situations
cannot be adequately addressed [26].
Methods
In the light of the academic commodification debate, our
research is interested in the conceptions of the human
body which actually underlie public attitudes towards
organ donation in Europe. This research interest aims at a
deeper understanding of public opinions by exploring
their ideational and motivational backgrounds, that is,
the subjective meanings they express and the cultural web
of ideas and values they are embedded in. Given the spe-
cific direction of this interest and the lack of precedent
research, methodological standards and systematic
knowledge in this field, we used qualitative methods to
gain access to this symbolic dimension.
Composition of samples
In qualitative socio-empirical research, focus groups,
moderated group discussions with usually not more than
8–10 participants [27], are an established tool for investi-
gating common sense beliefs and public topoi on a gen-
eral level [28]. Our analysis is based on the transcripts of
eight focus groups which were conducted in four Euro-
pean countries: Cyprus, Germany, the Netherlands and
Sweden.
The selection of countries was guided by an attempt to
obtain a rough cross-section of the variety of national reg-
ulatory and organizational frameworks of organ trans-
plantation in Europe. Of course the findings of qualitative
studies are not representative for a country or even Europe
as a whole. But an inter-European comparison allows for
building hypotheses about public moralities by abstract-
ing from specific national or religious backgrounds.
Two focus groups with 8–10 participants per group were
set up in each country. One consisted of lay people and
one of affected persons. The latter were patients who had
had a transplant, were waiting for a transplant or had
refused transplantation, along with relatives of such
patients. In total, 66 European citizens took part, 34 men
and 32 women. The participants were recruited using dif-
ferent strategies such as the distribution of flyers, online
and print advertisements or the snowball method. The
affected people were approached more directly with the
support of medical centers, self-help groups and patients'
organizations. The overall number of responses was in
Germany 85, in the Netherlands 71 and in Sweden 34 (for
Cyprus, no figures on overall response are available).
The composition of the groups was intended to achieve a
gender balance and to be as heterogeneous as possible in
regard to age and educational level. In regard to religion,
however, the composition often mirrored the respective
national situation; thus, in the Cypriot groups, all partici-
pants were of the Christian Orthodox faith, whereas the
Swedish groups showed a dominance of Protestants. A
degree of religiosity could not be given.
Method of data collection and analysis
In all countries, the group discussions were moderated by
two facilitators and followed the same semi-structured
Table 1: Group composition according to socio-demographic criteria
CYP GER NED SWE
aff lay aff lay aff lay aff lay
Gender m: 6/f: 3 m: 4/f : 4 m: 5/f: 3 M: 5/f: 5 m: 3/f: 6 m: 3/f: 4 m: 4/f: 3 M: 1/f: 7
Age 18–30: 2; 31–
45: 1; 46–60: 
5; > 60: 1
18–30: 4; 31–
45: 2; 46–60: 
2
18–30: 1, 46–
60: 3, > 60: 4
18–30: 5; 31–
45: 4; 46–60: 1
18–30: 1; 31–






60: 3; > 60: 2
31–45: 1; 46–
60: 1; > 60: 6
Education Sec. school 
dipl.: 4; univ. 
degr.: 5
Sec. school: 
2; univ. degr. 
6
Voc. school/
appr.: 4; sec. 




appr.: 1; sec. 
school dipl.: 6; 
univ. degr.: 3
Voc. school/
appr.: 3; sec. 
school dipl.: 3; 
univ. degr.: 3
Univ. degr. 7 Voc. school/
appr.: 2; sec. 
school dipl.: 4 
(inf.missing for 1 
person
Voc. school/
appr.: 2; univ. 
degr.: 6
Religion 9 chr. orth. 8 chr. orth. 3 pr., 1 isl., 4 
no
2 cat., 4 pr., 4 
no
2 pr.; 1 ca.; 1 
oth. chr. den.; 
1 isl., 4 no
2 pr.; 2 cat.; 
3 no
5 pr.; 2 no 6 pr.; 2 noPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:4 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/4
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questionnaire. The questionnaire contained a) a future
scenario of unlimited organ replacement, b) questions
about a hypothetical case of a proxy decision for a brain-
dead relative and open questions about c) attitudes
towards post-mortem and living donation, and d) public
policy. It was designed to initiate discussion and kick-off
a discursive dynamic through which participants would
be incited to bring in their positions and explicate under-
lying world views and value systems.
All discussions (lasting for 1.5 – 2 hours) were recorded
and transcribed, the transcripts made anonymous and
translated into English. The speaker codes used only pro-
vide information about gender (Mr./Ms.) and group
membership (aff/lay: affected person/lay person); the
country is also indicated: CYP: Cyprus, GER: Germany,
NED: Netherlands, SWE: Sweden. The coding process (=
assigning thematic categories to text passages) of the
material was conducted by two researchers in parallel with
Atlas.ti® scientific software. The coding was compared and
differences were adjusted. This approach reduced subjec-
tive bias. Since we were mainly interested in moral posi-
tions and cultural values, we followed a hermeneutic-
analytical procedure common in social science based on a
combination of qualitative content analysis [29] and
Grounded Theory [30]: Interpretive concepts were applied
to structure the material along our general research ques-
tions, but they were also developed inductively to identify
main lines of argument. The eight FGs' transcripts were
treated as one broad sample in which we compared inter-
individual arguments to justify or reject specific positions.
The final step of our analysis was the identification of
main lines of argument by working out a qualitative
typology of ideas and values lying behind them.
Results
Although a full commercialization of organ procurement
is rejected throughout all focus groups, the language of
commodification, instrumentalization and exploitation
seems to be densely interwoven with many argumentative
threads of the discussion. Several participants refer to
organ extraction as "harvesting" [Mr. N., NED_lay], "dis-
emboweling" [Mr. M., GER_lay] or as taking out of "spare
parts" [Ms. C., SWE_lay]. This imagery hints at the rele-
vance which background conceptions of self and body
already have for attitudes towards organ transplantation
in general and not only for the commercialization of
organ procurement in particular. Thus, the agricultural
image of a field which is harvested might tend to elicit dif-
ferent answers to the question as to what should be per-
mitted than the mechanistic imagery of the body as some
piece of machinery with replaceable parts might suggest
[31]. In the following section, the main types of images
and conceptions of self and body which appeared in our
focus groups will be described and explored with respect
to their interdependence with attitudes towards organ
donation as such and the commercialization of organ pro-
curement in particular.
"Just like cars": the body as private property
Many participants in all focus groups attach great impor-
tance to the idea of personal autonomy. For most of them,
this idea also comprises bodily self-determination in the
sense that one has the right to freely dispose of one's own
body. In the context of organ transplantation, this right
plays a crucial role when it comes to decision-making
processes. Thus, a Dutch speaker would "start from the
point that I have 100% self-determination over my own
body" [Mr. N., NED_lay]. And a speaker from Cyprus
declares: "What I will do with my body is my own busi-
ness." [Mr. A., CYP_lay]
On closer examination, two different conceptions of bod-
ily self-determination seem to present themselves. The
first one is premised on the idea that no other person may
make any claims with respect to one's own body or is
allowed to interfere with one's decisions concerning it. In
the group discussions, this "defensive" aspect of bodily
self-determination is stressed when it comes to the ques-
tion as to whether individuals have any responsibility or
obligation to donate, be it towards the family or society at
large. In these contexts, bodily self-determination is
widely and vehemently postulated as "the right to refuse"
[Ms. Q., NED_lay] donation, or, as these Swedish speakers
put it: " [T]hey do not have the right to take my organs if
I do not want them to." [Mr. B., SWE_aff] "No, it must
happen by free will." [Ms. W., SWE_aff]
However, the mere absence of third parties' claims to my
body or its parts does not necessarily imply that I myself
am entitled to freely dispose of it as I wish. After all, there
may still be limits to my bodily self-determination based
on religious or "philosophical" considerations (see
below). Thus, a German speaker who vehemently stresses
the right to refuse donation also states: "I have problems
with transplantations anyway because I believe ... that we
can't prolong life artificially and just for kicks, or replace
or manipulate it, because life as such ... has another sense
than immortality" [Mr. U., GER_lay]. In this respect, the
second conception of bodily self-determination goes
much farther, the postulate being that one has an unre-
stricted right to actively do with one's body whatever one
likes. In the focus groups, this "empowering" aspect of
free choice and self-development in view of one's body
primarily comes into play when future technological sce-
narios such as enhancement or infinite organ replacement
are discussed and assessed:
" [...] as long as it remains your own choice – referring
to what you said about getting new livers again andPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:4 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/4
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again while your mind wears away – as long as it
remains your own choice whether you get a new liver
or not then in my opinion there is no problem. When
at a certain point you say: well, I am seventy years old,
all this is not necessary for me, let me just await my
own time, then isn't that just fine? [...] But if some-
body else DOES choose to lengthen his life with new
organs again and again, I think it is up to him." [Ms.
R., NED_lay]
In the group discussions, the idea of bodily self-determi-
nation is frequently addressed in terms of ownership. The
notion "that [...] my body belongs to me" [Mr. I.,
GER_lay] appears to be deeply rooted in everyday intui-
tion because it is often presented as a consensual and
nearly self-evident point requiring no further justification,
as a Dutch speaker's argument against obligatory dona-
tion shows. As he says: "Everybody owns his own... has
the right to dispose of his own body... It's my body." [Mr.
N, NED_lay]
This idea of bodily self-determination in terms of owner-
ship seems to bring the human body in line with other
pieces of private property. On closer inspection, however,
the application of this ownership paradigm does not nec-
essarily imply approval of commercialization in the sense
of making money with one's body or its parts. On the con-
trary, money often seems to be perceived as a factor which
has the potential to impede self-determination by cor-
rupting persons and distorting their own proper will, that
way inducing them to do things they would not do other-
wise. Thus, the autonomy and authenticity of decisions
concerning the body can be called into doubt when finan-
cial motives are involved since this is seen as "something
different than voluntary registration" [Ms. D., NED_aff].
Against the background of similar considerations, Ger-
man participants discussing the obligatory psychological
test in the case of living donation even compare financial
incentives with other constraints on the freedom of deci-
sion such as psychological pressure in the family context.
On the other hand, arguments for bodily self-determina-
tion do show a certain affinity to a particular kind of body
conception. Thus, especially when discussing the pros and
cons of a future scenario in which self-preservation
through infinite organ replacement becomes technically
feasible, the participants frequently employ images from
the sphere of handicraft or engineering which suggest
analogies with the reparation of machinery in order to
address and articulate their position: "It actually will be
just like cars: Well, gosh, the radiator is broken or won't
live long: out with it, put a new one in." [Mr. N., NED_lay]
Such descriptions of the human body within the frame-
work of a mechanistic paradigm show a certain tendency
towards accentuating aspects of functionality and per-
formance when describing the body and its parts. These
aspects are usually also described in terms of mechanistic
and technological images such as automobiles, compar-
ing organ transplantation to "fixing a car" [Ms. E.,
CYP_aff]. Such is the case in this statement made by a par-
ticipant from the Netherlands:
"I have got 'Mercedes'-lungs. I had an argument with
my physician: I want 'Mercedes'-lungs, or else I want
to die. I mean it, I really said it like this. I have got
'Mercedes'-lungs, I don't want a 'Lada'. And then it
was: Mrs. V. – I have got 'Mercedes'-lungs for you. Let's
say it like this..." [Ms. V., NED_aff].
This mechanistic focus on functionality and performance
seems to correspond to a tendency to relativize all other
aspects of the body and thus to regard it like a mere "com-
modity". Hence, in discussing the provenance of a donor
organ, some participants almost exclusively discuss the
functional capabilities of the organ, explicitly denying
that any other features (artificial/organic, human/non-
human, living/dead, male/female) play any role. Moreo-
ver, from this perspective, organs are bereft of any sym-
bolic meaning and do not have any significance for the
person, the sentiment being that "only the mind can
change somebody, the parts do not change a human
being." [Ms. O., CYP_lay]
This disregard of all aspects except for functionality and
performance certainly plays no small role in the fact that
mechanistic body conceptions generally tend to promote
quite a positive and optimistic attitude towards the tech-
nological possibilities of modern biomedicine, as is
expressed in this statement from the Swedish group:
"So, one should probably not have an altogether neg-
ative attitude towards this [an overall replacement of
organs]. Since it can easily become, as we said, like sci-
ence fiction, let us replace this, let us replace ...that.
Just like when you take your car to the garage, it is
coughing and such, yes, let us replace that and fix that
and then you are off again." [Mr. B., SWE_aff]
"The human being is not a car": the body as part of a 
larger order
On the other hand, some lay people and patients in all four
European countries also point out several limitations to
autonomy and the free disposal of one's own body. One of
these limitations arises from the belief that the body is not
merely a piece of machinery with replaceable components,
but an organic entity with its own intrinsic structure and
dynamics which resist external interventions.
"But a human being is not a car." [Mr. F., NED_lay]
"No. That's right. It's being loaded just as heavy, but it
is not a car." [Mr. N., NED_lay] "And what do youPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:4 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/4
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mean by that?" [Moderator] "Well, a car: that is mate-
rial, it doesn't talk back, though it does wear out too...
but well, a human being is just something really differ-
ent, a lot more sensitive too... well, how do you
express that. It is not a thing, it is... well." [Mr. F.,
NED_lay]
In contrast to aforementioned mechanistic ideas, this
more organicistic conception is rarely ever articulated in a
direct and positive manner. This means that instead of
explaining their conception of the body by means of
explicit terms or images, the respective speakers often tend
to address it indirectly, that is, by negating and rejecting
mechanistic descriptions. Nevertheless, these conceptions
of the body seem to have important implications for peo-
ples' views and attitudes. They often correspond to a reluc-
tant, skeptical stance towards science and the conviction
that there are moral limits to technological possibilities.
Especially when moral directives cannot be derived from
the principle of self-determination, e.g. in the case of
proxy decisions for deceased relatives, the conception of
the holistic or organic nature of the human being and its
body is brought to bear as a moral orientation which even
has the potential to override relatives' presumptions:
"Well, if there is no decision, I mean it is clear that
nothing should be taken out. I mean this is crystal
clear. Because a human being as such is not a spare
parts store. Well, for me, this wouldn't be ethically
[Mr. M, GER_lay KNOCKS ON THE TABLE.] accepta-
ble at all." [Mr. U., GER_lay]
This sense that certain limits are given can be related to the
idea that nature itself has some sort of intrinsic, self-con-
tained order that sets limits to all human interventions. In
part, this notion is based on the religious image of nature
as divine creation. Thus, under the premise that the
human being was created by God and embodies divine
will, one Dutch speaker interprets the body in a teleolog-
ical manner as "a creation with a goal" [Mr. F., NED_lay].
On the other hand, the insistence on limits which is asso-
ciated with organicist views is sometimes embedded in
the non-religious idea of a natural order of things, which
imposes certain limits on human action and invests
human life with certain aims. This conviction often man-
ifests itself when speakers refer to nature or natural enti-
ties like the body in a moral line of argument or qualify
interventions in moral terms, calling them "natural" or
"unnatural."
Such underlying notions of a natural order are sometimes
accompanied by the conviction that one has the responsi-
bility to leave the body as it is and instead adapt one's own
behavior or way of life to the conditions set by one's nat-
ural bodily constitution. Thus, the aforementioned Ger-
man speaker continues, saying that "I have no right to
change my body in a way that I change parts there. Well,
if it no longer functions, I will have to find a way to deal
with the consequences of that, that is to say to deal with it
without operation" [Mr. U., GER_lay]. And a participant
from the Dutch group seems to proceed from the idea of
a divine natural teleology in which everything that occurs
has a function:
"I think you have been created for good reason, with
two kidneys." [Mr. F., NED_lay] "You have a kind of
back-up inside." [Mr. N., NED_lay] "Yes." [Mr. F.,
NED_lay] "You shouldn't start fiddling with people in
this respect. See, those things are there, you are born
like that and they have a function. Why do you have
two, why not one?" [Mr. Y., NED_lay]
In this line of thought, the body is often perceived less as
a passive, irresponsive object which is separate from the
self than as something more or less congruent with the
person as such. One way to conceptualize this monistic
intuition of an embodied self is to speak of the body as an
instance with its own inherent "authority" or "wisdom"
which can influence a person's attitudes, behaviors and
lifestyles:
"I guess there are also signs somehow from your body,
that, in a way you can't continue your life-style or
something like that ... No idea, if you smoke. Someday
you'll get, everything doesn't look like it should be
anymore or so. I think all these things are hints and
challenges, which will help you in a way to find out
what to change, and that you can change it, and that it
needs to be done." [Ms. G., GER_lay]
Such monistic conceptions can have a great impact when
it comes to attitudes towards organ donation. Thus, they
seem to promote the idea that (a part of) the donor lives
on in the body of the recipient via organ transplantation.
As this affected speaker from Cyprus explains, if body and
soul are – more or less – congruent, then a transfer of
physical parts can appear as a transfer of portions of one
person to another:
"I would know that a part of my child would breathe
and live in another body and I would have a part of my
child in life. Apart from saving a life, a part of child,
either an eye or a kidney or whatever, would be alive."
[Ms. E., CYP_aff]
The notion that (a part of) the donor lives on in the recip-
ient via organ transplantation makes it difficult to view or
treat organs as fungible commodities. Thus, many speak-
ers speculate as to whether attributes of the donor "may be
transferred to somebody psychosomatically and change a
person." [Mr. H., CYP_aff] Although such considerationsPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:4 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/4
Page 7 of 10
(page number not for citation purposes)
are often articulated in a slightly facetious manner, they
still play a major role in discussions, especially for the
affected people. Attributes which are considered to be
potentially transferable are e.g. character traits, prefer-
ences or aversions, talents or even hobbies:
"I would like to say something I read in a newspaper
seven years ago in Canada. A woman received a kidney
from a deceased donor. When she went home she
wanted to have a beer and a hamburger everyday at
lunch time, something that she never did in her life.
Thus, she wanted to find out who the donor was. She
discovered and the donor used to do this everyday at
lunch time..." [Mr. K., CYP_aff] "So, these things are
transferred." [Mr. H., CYP_aff]
"The brain makes us special": meaningful organs
The aforementioned complexes of self and body concep-
tions do not constitute two distinct, monolithic blocks.
There are contradictions within the camps and floating
boundaries between them. Thus, within the dualistic
framework of the property paradigm, the brain often
receives a specific status. It is identified as the physical basis
of a person's mind, its anchorage in the body, so to speak,
and thus the locus of personal identity. In this perspective,
the brain consequently marks a logical and technical limit
of bodily self-determination since it accommodates the self
itself: the subject of self-determination.
"There is one single organ that of course cannot be
replaced – that's the brain. That's what makes us spe-
cial. If we did replace it, in reality we actually wouldn't
replace the brain, rather we would give the brain a dif-
ferent body. Since it is the brain that makes you a per-
sonality. Other than that I'm in favor of replacing all
organs as soon as this can be done technically, biolog-
ically." [Mr. S., GER_aff]
Interestingly, one Dutch participant also holds that the
genitals should be excepted from transplantation because
he regards them as relevant for personal identity, as well,
due to progenitory considerations:
"I think there are two organs that certainly shouldn't
be transplanted and those are the brains and the geni-
tals. Because I think they do influence who you are.
Brains definitely, I think that you become a wholly dif-
ferent person. Namely the other person. They can not
do it [now], but if they could. And with the genitals –
you do not beget your own children, but someone
else's, suppose you would undergo a transplant as a
man. So that's ... not even allowed." [Mr. T., NED_aff]
Eventually, in one Cypriot group, a discussion about the
status of the eyes evolved, indicating that some partici-
pants also consider them as relevant to personal identity.
In this context, the special status of the eyes is not based
on their visibility, alone; they are rather described as a
kind of gateway to the person's inner self:
"Ms. X. has said something earlier. That is, "I think it
is better if the eyes of the child live..."" [Moderator]
„Not only the eyes. But the issue of eyes has impressed
me because I had heard about such a case in the past.”
[Ms. X., CYP_lay] "Would it be remarkable because we
see the eyes whereas we don't see the liver or the kid-
ney?" [Moderator] "You see the person through the
eyes" [Ms. O., CYP_lay].
The view that the brain has an exceptional status has sig-
nificant consequences for an evaluation of organ trans-
plantation in at least two respects. First of all, it establishes
certain reasons for accepting the occurrence of brain death
as marking the death of a person as such. If personal iden-
tity is an exclusively spiritual phenomenon which is based
on brain functions but detached from the rest of the body,
an irreversible breakdown of brain functions simultane-
ously marks the death of the person as a whole, leaving
only a "living body":
"I think that the body may be still alive but to me this
person would be dead.... perhaps I may not say that
he/she is dead, perhaps I would say that the body lives
and therefore I would kill it by myself in order to take
the organs and give them to somebody else... because
the body lives. But in this case I would perhaps say that
"yes, I have no problem" because I would give life to
other people. Perhaps I would take life by myself but I
would give it to other people because I would know
that it was over." [Mr. L., CYP_lay]
Secondly, on the basis of the notion that the brain has a
particular status, several speakers, especially in the groups
of lay people, also strictly reject any speculations about
the possibility of transmitting personality or personal
characteristics through transplantation of other organs,
since " [p]ersonality does not come with the heart." [Ms.
P., SWE_lay]:
"But it is a technical organ, I mean, someone's hobbies
don't reside in his kidney. Perhaps it resides in your
brains, but my kidneys don't indicate that I love sport.
At the utmost they have been influenced by that, that
perhaps they are in better shape, but that implies only
their technical state. And that could perfectly fit in
someone else's body." [Ms. Z., NED_lay]
A transplant receiver from the Dutch group who declares
that he is „not so sensitive to what I will disrespectfully
call "ghost stories"” (i.e. personality-transmission narra-
tives) even offers an alternative, exclusively naturalistic
explanation referring toPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:4 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/4
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"...the physical phenomenon that a tissue has a certain
dependence on a certain substance, you know your
'tostis', and that the desire comes with that. ..." [Mr. J.,
NED_aff]
Interestingly, in the course of the discussion, the selfsame
patient also states that his down-to-earth naturalism
might be a coping strategy to avoid emotional stress. This
stress could be induced by thinking about "his" organ
donor and "to protect myself from that, also because I'm
afraid I would get too carried away" [Mr. J., NED_aff].
Discussion
Throughout all group discussions, we actually found a great
number of references to cultural images and conceptions of
self and body. On our level of analysis we could not detect
any national differences. Three main positions seem to
present themselves in all four European countries: On the
one hand, arguments in favor of maximum bodily self-
determination are often articulated in terms of ownership
of the body. In this context, body conceptions which
address the body as some kind of machine composed of
single elements which can be replaced by functional equiv-
alents are particularly prominent. In contrast, limits to bod-
ily self-determination are often expressed against the
background of a more or less articulate notion that human
beings and the human body belong to some higher realm,
be it that of divine creation or of a natural order of things.
Finally, there are arguments which accentuate specific
organs, mainly the brain, but also the genitals and the eyes,
thus implying more differentiated conceptions of bodily
self-determination and unavailability.
These findings show certain similarities to the results of pre-
vious studies [32]. However, the body-self conceptions we
found apparently do not possess the character of explicit
positions based on articulate arguments; on the contrary,
they seem to operate as background notions that are deeply
rooted in particular cultural customs and traditions [33].
Moreover, their connections to peoples' attitudes towards
organ donation and its commercialization are far more
complex and difficult to trace than the scheme of Jorale-
mon and Cox suggests [25]. Thus, although the participants
frequently refer to the notion of ownership when talking
about the human body, this does not necessarily imply that
they consider the body as some piece of private property
available for commerce. On the contrary, the concept of
ownership often rather seems to serve as a metaphor for
autonomy and bodily self-determination, principles which
can as well imply a rejection of commercialization. In this
respect, the idea of self-ownership seems to be at least
ambivalent [34]. Moreover, claiming one's right to bodily
self-determination can serve as a basis for rejecting third
parties' claims to one's body and organs as well as for justi-
fying extensive use of the technological possibilities of
transplantation medicine. Those who held that limits are
placed on bodily self-determination, on the other hand,
often based their arguments on convictions which refer to
natural order or divine creation. These conceptions, how-
ever, can be used to reject organ transplantation or com-
modification as unnatural or against god's will, but also
prepare the ground for the idea that a person has no exclu-
sive rights over her own body. Finally, there is evidence of
certain "organocentric" conceptions of the body which
identify particular organs as central to personal identity.
Such organs may demarcate a definite limit to any technical
modification, transmission or commercialization, the
notion being that these practices would affect the person-
hood and self-understanding of both, donors and receivers.
But their identification seems to depend on socio-cultural
and bio-philosophical background assumptions which are
embedded in culturally and historically variable contexts
(see table 1).
Conclusion
Although more and broader representative research on
these topics would be necessary and valuable, our sample
allows conclusions that could inform applied ethics and
constitute hypotheses for further sociological and anthro-
pological research. Thus, the way we found lay people and
patients to think about the body and organ donation may
correspond with some of the academic philosophical and
anthropological positions on commodification described
above. But in contrast to academic authors' restriction to
(or preference for) one single paradigm, we observe a plu-
rality of different body conceptions among the public
which are interwoven with their attitudes towards trans-
plantation medicine in rather complex ways.
Against this backdrop, we conclude that the language of
commodification is much too simple to capture what is at
stake in everyday life intuitions about organ donation and
organ sale. Those who base their evaluation of commer-
cialization in organ procurement on a (pro or con) stance
to commodification should be aware of the variety of
ideas regarding the human body. This is necessary in order
to reflect the anthropological assumptions implicit in
their own arguments and their prevalence on a socio-
political level (for the public and those who would be
motivated to donate or sell their organs). Whether there is
any intersubjectively graspable way of ever proving the
adequacy or plausibility of a particular conception of the
human body is doubtful, however. Therefore, the more
interesting question is how bioethical discourse and polit-
ical practices confront the plurality of body-self concep-
tions in the public as a given reality. We see at least two
basic possibilities:
On the one hand, one could defend an "anthropologically
informed" position, arguing that the body has a particularPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:4 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/4
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constitution which makes it either resist or suit commod-
ification. This position would take on a certain experto-
cratic air since it would seem to claim definitive objective
insights into the nature of human beings and their corpo-
real existence. Besides the epistemological question of
how such insights could be gained and justified in the first
place, it would be interesting to see how this approach
would handle or "sublate" recent plurality. How, for
example, would it deal with uninformed, ignorant or dis-
interested lay people who simply insist on having their
own views on body and self? Given the fact that in mod-
ern, liberal democracies not superior insights, but the will
of the majority determines (within the limits of constitu-
tional rights and democratic procedures) the legitimacy of
political decisions, there seems to be no way of imposing
certain body conceptions on those who simply do not
accept them. Thus, when it comes to ethical recommenda-
tions and political consultation, anthropological
approaches will have to find a way to incorporate public
attitudes and psychological images as well as socio-cul-
tural conceptions of the body instead of simply insisting
on the superiority of particular expert theories.
On the other hand, one could take a liberal approach and
try to get rid of all substantial anthropological or meta-
physical assumptions from the very start in order to
approximate a "neutral" framework for the peaceful coex-
istence of a plurality of worldviews. In this spirit of toler-
ance, however, one must be all the more aware of some
liberal thinkers' affinity to Lockean self-ownership and
the distinct world view of modern science which imply
and promote particular mechanistic conceptions of
nature, the self and the body [23]. To this end, a liberal
position might have to abandon the pretence that they
take an agnostic perspective on the body and refrain from
addressing existential questions, engaging – instead – in
an explicit discussion on the plurality of existing concep-
tions of the body. This way, liberality would not demand
exclusion of the body from public discourse, but rather
explicit admission, acknowledgement and protection of
the plurality of ideas which are attached to it, e.g. through
the development of legal regulations which are not based
on any fixed body-related conceptions.
The sketched heuristic distinction between the "anthropo-
logically informed" approach and the liberal approach
should not be confused with other prominent classifica-
tions such as the one of "bioconservatism" versus "tran-
shumanism" in the debate on human enhancement [35].
Our distinction is located on a more general level insofar
as it refers to bioethical and political approaches towards
the plurality of body conceptions while "bioconserva-
tism" and "transhumanism" rather stand for two specific
positions within this plurality. Hence, in the perspective of
our distinction, both positions can be advanced in an
"anthropologically informed" as well as in a liberal man-
ner, depending on their way of dealing with plurality.
Thus, the "transhumanist" stance that "current human
nature is improvable through the use of applied science
and other rational methods" ([35], p. 202) rather seems
to express an "anthropologically informed" approach
because it obviously claims insights into the existence and
qualities of human nature. And the "bioconservative"
counter position can definitely represent a liberal
approach as long as it does not rely on a particular concep-
tion of human nature, but rather mirrors respect for actual
"bioconservative" consensus among the general public.
Another prominent bioethical and political debate in
which the capacities of both, „anthropologically
informed“ approaches as well as liberal approaches, are
challenged, evolves around the problem of death in the
context of modern biomedicine. On the one hand, a con-
ception of death, explicit or not, is of central importance
for many fields of biomedical practice, from organ pro-
curement policies to the withdrawal of life sustaining
treatment. On the other hand, however, it is widely agreed
that death is not simply an objective scientific fact that can
be determined by means of empirical research. Under-
standings of death are always embedded in cultural, reli-
gious or metaphysical views. Nowadays, there actually
exists a wide plurality of such world views which can lead
to quite different conceptions of death [36]. In this situa-
tion, the State of New Jersey's law on brain death [37], as
well as more recent legislation in Japan [38] seem to point
towards a liberal strategy which allows the individual to
choose a definition of death for him or herself. From an
anthropologically informed point of view, however, it can
be questioned whether this really constitutes a satisfactory
solution. After all, assuming (and be it just for the sake of
the argument) that there is one definite answer to the
question of death, a contravening practice would simply
amount to an instance of killing, although perhaps at the
request of the person killed.
Against this background, the two approaches could possi-
bly rather be understood in the sense of two diametrical,
but at the same time complementary and mutually correc-
tive perspectives. Both seem to be needed for an adequate
consideration of plurality in bioethical and political
debates touching upon body conceptions: The liberal per-
spective, on the one hand, makes us aware of the wide
range of individual ideas regarding the body in modern
pluralistic societies, thus preventing us from naïvely tak-
ing our own intuitive views as self evident facts. And the
"anthropologically informed" perspective, on the other
hand, provokes us to really take each of these conceptions
seriously, respect their claims for validity and consider
their ideational and normative implications as well as
their social consequences – rather than just content our-Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2009, 4:4 http://www.peh-med.com/content/4/1/4
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selves with comfortable illusions of indifferent coexist-
ence or a superficial "anything goes".
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